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Abstract
Why do banks suddenly tighten the criteria needed for credit? Credit
crunches are often explained by the implementation of new regulatory
rules or by sudden drops in ﬁrm quality. We present a novel model of
an artiﬁcial credit market and show that crunches have a tendency to
occur even if ﬁrm quality remains constant, as well as when there are
no new regulatory rules stipulating lenders capital requirements. We
ﬁnd evidence in line with the asset deterioration hypothesis and results
that emphasise the importance of accurate ﬁrm quality estimates. In
addition, we ﬁnd that an increase in the debts’ time to maturity re-
duces the probability of a credit crunch and that a conservative lending
approach is intrinsically related to the onset of crunches. Thus, our
results suggest some up till now partially overlooked components con-
tributing to the ﬁnancial stability of an economy.
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JEL: C63, E51, G21
1 Introduction
During a timespan of over twenty years, from the early nineties to present
date, nearly all developed countries have experienced some form of supply
side credit crunch in parts of their economies. During a crunch, seemingly
eligible borrowers ﬁnd it hard to get credit under reasonable terms, forcing
ﬁrms that rely on external capital to a halt. Why do providers of credit
suddenly mobilise their lending strategies in such a way? Existing theories
provide a useful platform when building an understanding of the determi-
nants of crunches. According to the Risk-Based Capital hypothesis (RBC),
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1the implementation of new risk-based regulatory rules governing lenders’
allocation of resources, may have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the sup-
ply of credit. Berger and Udell (1994) tested the RBC hypothesis on the
perceived crunch in the US after the implementation of the ﬁrst Basel Ac-
cord in the late eighties/early nineties. They found some support in favor
of the RBC hypothesis but refrained from ruling out competing theories.
Sharpe (1995) on the other hand claimed that banks reduce credit supply
due to unpredicted losses in bank capital. In analogy with the RBC hy-
pothesis, he concluded that the reduction in credit coincides with banks
having diﬃculties in meeting the minimum regulatory capital requirements.
Pazarbasioglu (1996) found evidence in line with the asset deterioration hy-
pothesis, suggesting that banks become less willing to supply credit during
periods associated with a deterioration in asset quality. In addition, accord-
ing to the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis, ﬁrst discussed by Minsky (1975,
1992), economies have a tendency to naturally evolve into a “Ponzi” phase
in which ﬁrms are forced to borrow to meet their obligations on existing lia-
bilities. Since lenders judge liability structures subjectively, sudden drops in
the supply of credit may occur when corporate debt reaches some unforeseen
threshold.
A common aspect in these theories is that some “out of lender” con-
trolled event is to blame for sudden drops in credit supply. The driving
force is either an evolutionary force in ﬁrm liability structures, regulatory
changes or some unresolved issue of asymmetric information characterising
the credit market. Thus, existing theories pay little attention to the “in-
lender” determinants of credit crunches. Turning to the existing literature
on banking, lenders are forced to deal with excessive information asymmetry
problems since borrowers have reason to withhold information in order to
gain credit. Lenders seek to resolve this problem by practicing screening,
Allen (1990), and monitoring, Winton (1995), thus reducing their exposure
to counter party risk. If the estimates used in these procedures are based on
subjective judgments of acceptable liability structures or fail to incorporate
risks driven by exogenous shocks, such shocks may lead to a reduction in
credit supply due to unforeseen losses. This suggests that the estimates used
in the lenders’ screening procedures inﬂuence the credit supply. Hence, the
decisions made by suppliers of credit play an important role in the evolution
of debt and ultimately on the eruption of credit crunches.
In this paper, we focus on the decisions made by lenders and ﬁnd that
the level of conservatism practiced when banks pursue their internal credit
risk goal plays a key part in determining the onset of crunches. We also ﬁnd
that an increase in the debt’s time to maturity, reduces the probability of a
credit crunch. In addition, we are able to conﬁrm the importance of accurate
estimates in the banks’ screening procedures and ﬁnd evidence in line with
the asset deterioration hypothesis. The ﬁndings are based on simulations of
a novel artiﬁcial agent based economy derived from a fairly general banking
2model in which lenders screen applicants in order to reduce their exposure
to default risk. We do not focus on the distinctive nature of asset value
deterioration, nor do we focus on the implementation of new risk-based
regulatory rules. We track the determinants of crunches from a diﬀerent
angle, by analyzing the banks’ proﬁt maximising decisions under various
economic conditions. Due to the dynamic and complex nature of credit
crunches, we derive an Agent Based Model (ABM) of the credit market and
show that sudden drops in the supply of credit will evolve even if lenders have
close to perfect information about their debt contract counterparts. The
simulations show that the credit market has a natural tendency to evolve
into periods characterised by over lending, in which banks acquire riskier
debt than what is speciﬁed by its proﬁt maximising condition. Such periods
are swiftly followed by periods in which banks try to cut back on risky
debt, making credit diﬃcult to obtain. If such“cutbacks” are coordinated
across banks, the market may experience the eruption of a credit crunch.
These crunches are seemingly spontaneous but highly dependent on the
speed by which lenders adjust to internal credit risk goals, the debts time
to maturity, the spread between lending and deposit rates, accurate ﬁrm
quality estimates and the parameters deﬁning the evolution of ﬁrm assets.
We link the speed of adjustment to the level of conservatism within the
bank’s organizational structure. The real world equivalence can be thought
of as lenders’ willingness to engage in new risky ventures or their willingness
to use new and unexplored debt instruments.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the
theoretical underpinnings of the model. This is followed by a description of
the artiﬁcial economies model environment and the conditions driving the
behaviour of the agents. In the ﬁnal sections we present and discuss the
results derived from the simulations and conclude.
2 Theoretical underpinnings
A credit crunch is deﬁned as a period of time in which credit and invest-
ment capital is hard to obtain. Viewing banks as ﬁnancial intermediators
and providers of investment capital, this deﬁnition suggests that the onset
of credit crunches are related to the banks’ screening and monitoring pro-
cedure. The information production in imperfect screening and its adverse
pool eﬀects have been studied previously by Broecker (1990), Chiesa (1998)
and Gehrig (1998) among others. This section considers the case in which
banks practice perfect screening in order to reduce their exposure to credit
risk. In contrast with previous studies, we consider a continuum of ﬁrm
qualities and view screening as truncating the distribution function deﬁning
ﬁrm quality.
Consider a two-period economy under the supervision of a ﬁnancial au-
3thority. The economy is made up of a ﬁnite number of risk-neutral ﬁrms,
k = 1,...,M, and banks, i = 1,2,...,N, providing unsecured credit to ﬁrms.
Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of quality summarised by
θk ∈ [0,1], which is privately known by the ﬁrms. At the initial date, ﬁrms
are given the choice of carrying out a risky project lasting one time pe-
riod. In order to undertake the project, ﬁrms need to raise external capital
equivalent to lk on the credit market. The gross return of the investment,
R(θk) ∈ [0,∞], is realised after one time period and retrieved with proba-
bility 1 − θk. Firm returns are increasing in θk such that ﬁrm quality also
represents the riskiness of ﬁrm actions. A high quality ﬁrm is thus charac-
terised by a low value of θk. The distribution of ﬁrm returns are binary and
the success rate of the investment is ﬁrm size independent. For simplicity,
it is assumed that in case of failure the ﬁrm defaults without liquidation
value, allowing us to interpret θk as the ﬁrm’s probability to default. Thus,
ﬁrms are protected by limited liability such that they only care about the
payoﬀs when the project succeeds. As such, the ﬁrms always implement
their projects when granted a loan.
As in Diamond (1984), banks act as information producers about the
ﬁrms’ investment projects. Here, it is assumed that banks observe the den-
sity of ﬁrm quality, f(θ), from which they make a noisy ﬁrm estimate θb
k,i.
We let the interest rate on external capital, r, and the deposit rate, ρ, be
exogenous to the model and assume that lending is the banks’ only source of







(1 + rl)(1 − θb
k) − 1
#
lk − ρD (2.1)
where m is the subgroup of ﬁrms facing their demand towards the representa-
tive bank and D is the bank’s deposits. To purely study the eﬀects of lending
while ignoring the bank’s exposure to deposit risks, it is assumed that the
bank ﬁnances lending using a stock of own capital, i.e. equity. The bank’s eq-
uity is given by E such that
$ ˆ m∈M
k lk ≤ E and E −
$ ˆ m∈M
k lk ≥ ˆ E where ˆ E
is the minimum capital requirement as decided by the ﬁnancial authorities
and ˆ m is the number of ﬁrms granted credit. As such, the deposit costs
in (2.1) can be ignored. Thus, the interest rate on external capital, r, is
interpreted as the spread between the lending and the deposit rate. Since
banks observe the distribution of ﬁrm quality, the banks’ beliefs about θk are
taken on M. Using this, we rewrite the representative bank’s unconditional
expected proﬁt function in (2.1) as:
πe




where θe is the expected default rate (quality). From the bank’s expected
4proﬁt function in (2.2), it is fairly obvious that above some value of θe,
expected bank-proﬁt turns negative. More speciﬁcally, in the unconditional
case the bank only participates on the credit market if:
θe ≤ r/(1 + r)
However, as discussed by Gehrig (1998), when a contract is negotiated,
banks may prefer to screen applicants in order to assess their credit risks. As
such, it is assumed that the bank resolves the possibility of negative proﬁts
by screening applicants to identify risky ﬁrms which are removed from the
bank’s credit portfolio. We assume for the remainder of this section that
the bank has the ability to practice perfect and costless screening such that
θb
k = θk. This allows us to study the bank’s ﬁrst best solution and to derive
the determinants of the requirements needed for credit.
The process of screening loan applicants can be thought of as discrimi-
nating between ﬁrms and only picking ﬁrms that live up to some minimum
requirements for credit. Thus, we view screening as choosing a suitable value
of a truncating function λ, constructed to be the function that solves:
E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗(λ)] = λθe, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (2.3)
where θ∗(λ) is the truncation point on f(θ), monotonically increasing in
λ. The criterion needed for credit is represented by θ∗(λ) and the expres-
sion in (2.3) states the expected default rate (quality) in the subpopula-
tion of ﬁrms below the truncation point, i.e. the conditional expected
default rate. The distribution of ﬁrm quality for some general distribu-
tion is displayed in Figure 1 in which we see that the bank screens ap-
plicants and reduces its exposure to default risk by truncating the distri-
bution of ﬁrm quality. However, given any probability density function of
ﬁrm quality for θk ∈ [0,1] and a ﬁnite sample of ﬁrms (M), by trunca-
tion of f(θ), the bank will reduce the sample size of eligible ﬁrms forcing
a reduction of the bank’s credit supply. To see this, we acknowledge that





k lk, there exists some proﬁt maximising value
of λ and the bank’s optimisation problem boils down to a decision between
quality and quantity of credit. Hence, if the bank tightens the criterion
needed for credit, i.e. it reduces θ∗, fewer ﬁrms will default on their loans
but the supply of credit will drop, reducing the bank’s potential proﬁts. This
crucial link between the bank’s credit supply and the screening procedure
of loan applicants provides a useful platform when forming a understanding
of the determinants of credit crunches.
To explore this link we acknowledge that the bank’s expected credit sup-
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Figure 1: Screening reduces the expected default rate.








For tractability, let the expected credit supply function be based on the proﬁt
maximising value of θ∗. This allows us to deﬁne a weight, ω, that scales the
now constant probability in (2.4). Since θ∗ is monotonically increasing in λ
and since E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗(λ)] is linear in λ, we solve the bank’s expected credit
supply function by scaling ω with λ, restricting the weight to positive values.





Combining (2.5) with the deﬁnition of the conditional expected default rate
in (2.3) and the bank’s expected proﬁt function in (2.2) gives us the bank’s
conditional expected proﬁt function:




Maximising (2.6) with respect to λ and simplifying results in the bank’s ﬁrst
order condition1:
∂E[πb|θk ≤ θ∗]/∂λ = ω [r − 2(1 + r)θeλ]
m∈M !
k
lk = 0 (2.7)
1For illustrative reasons the regulatory bodies restriction is ignored.
6such that λ∗ = λ∗ (θe,r) conditioned on the proﬁt maximising value of θ∗.
More speciﬁcally, we use the ﬁrst order condition in (2.7) and solve for the





Since ∂λ∗/∂r > 0 and since θ∗ is monotonically increasing in λ, the model
predicts an increase in θ∗ if the spread between the lending and the deposit
rate is increased. In addition, since ∂λ∗/∂θe < 0, we conclude that the
bank tightens the criterion needed for credit if the unconditional expected
default rate is increased. Combining (2.8) with the deﬁnition of the bank’s
conditional expected default rate in (2.3), we get the bank’s proﬁt maximis-
ing conditional expected default rate, expressed only as a function of the
interest rate spread:




The expression in (2.9) highlights the importance of interest rates on the
criterion needed for credit and since ∂E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗(λ∗)]/∂r > 0, we con-
clude that an increase in the spread between the lending and the deposit
rate increases the amount of credit risk undertaken by banks. In addition,
by substituting for (2.8) and (2.9) in (2.6), we express the bank’s proﬁt
maximising conditional expected proﬁt function in terms of the models ex-
ogenous variables:







with ∂E[πb|θk ≤ θ∗(λ∗)]/∂r > 0 and ∂E[πb|θk ≤ θ∗(λ∗)]/∂θe < 0. Studying
the implications of (2.10), we see that the bank expects positive proﬁts by
screening out unwanted ﬁrms, conditioned on perfect estimates of ﬁrm qual-
ity. However, by viewing the bank’s expected proﬁts as expected revenue,
(2.10) also corresponds to the bank’s expected deposit costs in a perfectly
competitive economic environment.
Summing up our ﬁndings so far, in this section we have derived a simple
theoretical banking model in which banks maximise proﬁts by screening ap-
plicants and removing risky ﬁrms from its credit portfolio. Despite its simple
construct, the model is able to highlight the importance of ﬁrm quality and
the spread between lending and deposit rates on the criterion needed for
credit. Since a credit crunch is deﬁned as a period in time in which credit
and investment capital are hard to obtain, we argue that a tightening of
the criterion needed for credit, and its determinants, is intrinsically related
to the onset of a credit crunch. Despite this however, the theoretical model
fails to capture the distinctive nature of credit crunches. Credit crunches are
7by deﬁnition dynamic phenomena since the tightening of the criterion needs
to be coordinated across banks throughout a period of time. By viewing the
credit market as a complex adaptive system, we proceed with constructing
an artiﬁcial credit market based on the insights from the theoretical model
presented in this section.
3 An artiﬁcial credit market
Through the theoretical two-period model in the previous section, we found
variables that inﬂuence the representative bank’s decision regarding the cri-
terion needed for credit. However, the model fails to capture the dynamics
of a credit market. In addition, it provides us with few new insights con-
cerning the distinctive nature of credit crunches. To cope with these issues,
this section expands the model by viewing the credit market as a complex
adaptive system, as deﬁned in Tesfatsion (2006). As such, we construct
an Agent Based Model (ABM) of a credit market based on repeated debt
contracts. The theoretical model in the previous section is used as the base
on which we build the new model. This allows us to compare and validate
the results derived in this section with the theoretical results derived in the
previous section. We ﬁrst discuss the details of the artiﬁcial economy and
then derive the decision rules governing the agents’ behaviour, making the
model suitable for a complex dynamic economic environment with repeated
outcomes.
3.1 The model
The ABM is set on a ﬁnite spaced torus populated with an initial number
of ﬁrms (k = 1,...,M) and banks (i = 1,...,N) spread out on a grid at
random. By situating the agents on a torus we are able to simulate the
liquidity of the credit market as discussed and deﬁned in detail later in this
section. Time is discrete and represents new possible debt-contracts and/or
maturity dates. Banks are governed by a ﬁnancial authority stipulating a
regulatory rule requiring banks to hold own capital based on the Capital
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) such that for any given bank and time:
CARi,t ≥ K, 0 ≤ K ≤ 1 (3.1)
where K represents the minimum capital requirements. All debt owned
by the bank is unweighted and the sum of a bank’s Tier-capital is equiv-
alent to the bank’s equity capital, henceforth referred to as the banks eq-
uity. In analogy with the theoretical model in the previous section, ﬁrm
quality, θk, is measured as the ﬁrms’ ability to repay the debt, i.e. the
probability of default and banks truncate ﬁrm quality to maximise proﬁts.
Firm quality is drawn from a truncated two parameter beta distribution,
8θ ∼ Beta(α,β)|θk<T , where the beta distribution is chosen for its ability to
replicate bounded distributions of ﬁrm quality.2 At every time step, ﬁrms
search the torus for external capital through a 3600 random walk. The torus
is of size b2 where b ∈ divisible with remainder.
When a ﬁrm encounters a bank, the ﬁrm states its demand for credit
which the bank evaluates according to the regulatory rule in (3.1). If the
bank lives up to the requirement, it makes a noisy estimate of the ﬁrm’s
probability of default, θb
k,i = θk+φk,i with support [0,T ] where φk,i is a ran-
dom draw from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
σf. Estimates outside of the support region are re-estimated. If the bank’s
estimate of ﬁrm quality is below the truncation point, a debt contract is
formed. The debt lasts for, at least, κ time periods and is repaid upon the
ﬁrm-bank encounter, making the maturity date of the contract stochastic.
Thus, we allow for diﬀerent maturity dates without specifying the details in
the contract. In addition, ﬁrms are restricted from lending until it repays
the debt with interest. If the bank rejects the ﬁrm’s demand for credit, the
ﬁrm continues its search for a debt contract.
Given the above, the probability of a ﬁrm-bank encounter depends on the
debts minimum time to maturity (κ), the size of the torus (b) as well as on
the number of ﬁrms (Mt) and banks (Nt) active on the credit market. Since
a ﬁrm previously in debt is restricted from signing a new debt contract until
the previously acquired debt is repaid and since a debt contract is formed
upon a ﬁrm-bank encounter, these parameters implicitly deﬁne the liquidity
of the credit market. As such, we denote market liquidity as ψ(κ,b,Mt,Nt)
where the last three parameters deﬁnes the density of the credit market.
When exploring the properties of liquidity as deﬁned above, we acknowledge
that a sparsely populated credit market, relative to the size of the torus,
may experience random demand-side drops in credit reducing the overall
indebtedness of ﬁrms. However, if ψ is large, sudden drops in the aggregate
debt level only reﬂects the decisions made by the suppliers of credit allowing
us to vary ψ when simulating variations in the liquidity of the credit market.
Given the above, we state the probability of a debt contract being formed
by bank i at any given date as:
Pr(Contracti,t) = h(ψ (κ,b,Mt,Nt),Pr(θk ≤ θ∗
i,t),Pr(CARi,t ≥ K)) (3.2)
The ﬁrst term in (3.2) determines how the frequency in the debt contract
formation is aﬀected by market liquidity. The second two terms determine
how the probability of a debt contract is aﬀected by the supply side of credit.
Using the deﬁnition of a credit crunch as a period in time in which
credit and investment capital is hard to obtain, sudden reductions in the
supply of credit can be tracked back to the frequency in which new debt
2The truncation is motivated by the equation of motion deﬁning ﬁrm asset values,
discussed in detail below.
9contracts are formed. Since the probability in (3.2) depends on the capital
adequacy ratio as well as the acceptable level of credit risk, the model has the
ability to capture eﬀects on credit crunches caused by the implementation of
new regulatory rules as well as the eﬀects caused by a deterioration in ﬁrm
quality. However, since reductions in credit supply needs to be coordinated
across banks in order for a credit crunch to erupt, we state the probability







Hence, the complement of (3.3) deﬁnes the probability that no debt contract
will be signed at time t, arguably an important component determining the
probability of a credit crunch. Since the probability that a contract will be
signed at time t depends on Pr(CARi,t ≤ K), the probability in (3.3) relates
to the bank’s ability to build up equity, dependent on the bank’s expected
proﬁt and choice of criterion needed for credit. As we will see, this in turn
depends on the bank’s previous encounters. In addition, due to the ﬁnite
number of ﬁrms, the bank’s debt portfolio is indirectly dependent on the debt
portfolios of its competitors due to random spill-over eﬀects of counter party
risk. Returning to (3.2) and acknowledging that the probabilities by this
reasoning are dependent, we see that the model is complex, motivating the
use of simulation techniques when determining the determinants of crunches.
3.2 The Firms
Firms are assumed to be born debt free with a pre-speciﬁed initial value
of equity, E
f
0, identically distributed across ﬁrms. Firms are deﬁned by the








t , t ≥ 1
where A
f
t is the ﬁrm’s asset value, E
f
t is the ﬁrm’s equity value and L
f
t is the
value of ﬁrm liabilities at time t. As discussed in the previous section, ﬁrms
always implement their projects when granted credit. However, the demand
for investment capital may vary between time periods. Using this, we let a





where ηt ∼ U(0,1) resulting in 0 ≤ lt ≤ E
f
t . If the bank’s estimate of ﬁrm
quality lies below the truncation point and the bank meets the requirements
made by the model’s regulatory body, the ﬁrm is granted credit from the
bank to fund a risky project. The project lasts until the loan’s maturity date
on which the ﬁrm generates a gross return of RTm if the project succeeds,
where Tm = t + τ(κ) denotes the loan’s maturity date with ∂τ/∂κ > 0.
10When determining the equation of motion deﬁning the evolution of the
ﬁrms’ asset values, we use the results in the work of Black and Scholes (1973)
and Merton (1974) such that the probability that the ﬁrm defaults on its
loan can be derived from the ﬁrm’s asset value. Assuming that the ﬁrm fails




t , we write the equation of
motion deﬁning the representative ﬁrm’s asset value as:3
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f




where Φ−1(θ) is the inverse of the standard normal distribution taken at ﬁrm
quality and where ∆WTm ∼ N(0,1). Note that (3.4) requires T ≤ 0.5 such
that θ ∈ [0,0.5] due to the symmetry of the standard normal distribution.
Given (3.4), the asset value of the ﬁrm remains constant between maturity
dates and the ﬁrm defaults with probability θ when the project’s proﬁt is
realised. If the asset value of the ﬁrm drops below zero, the ﬁrm ﬁles for
bankruptcy and fails to meet its obligations to the bank. Thus, we have
a steady ﬂow of ﬁrms exiting the credit market through bankruptcy. The
ﬁrm-entry process is governed by a simple rule requiring the number of
ﬁrms active in the credit market at time t to be approximately equal to
the constant and pre-speciﬁed ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, Mt ≈ M. Hence, in
every time period the model gives birth to dt−1 new ﬁrms, where dt−1 is the
number of ﬁrm defaults in the previous time period. Since ﬁrms with a high
value of θk have a high probability of default and since θk is drawn from the
truncated beta distribution, a consequence of the ﬁrm-entry process is that
∂θe
t/∂t < 0, i.e. the economic environment grows “safer” with time.
3.3 The Banks
In analogy with the theoretical model in the previous section, banks use
equity to provide ﬁrms with loans. The equity value of the banks at the
initial date, Eb
0, is pre-speciﬁed and identically distributed across banks.
At the end of each time period, banks will have accumulated proﬁts from
matured loans, funded new projects using its equity and suﬀered from de-
faulted loans. Using this, we construct the equation of motion deﬁning the





















, t ≥ 1
where Ab
t is the bank’s asset value, Eb
t is the bank’s equity, Lb
t is the value
of the bank’s outstanding debt, mt ∈ Mt is the number of ﬁrms facing their
demand towards the representative bank, ˆ mn
t is the number of ﬁrms granted
3See Appendix A for details.
11credit at time t, ˆ mt is the number of ﬁrms in the bank’s debt portfolio at
time t and where md
t is the number of ﬁrms repaying their debt at time t.
As in the previous section, banks screen applicants to maximise proﬁts
by truncating the distribution function deﬁning ﬁrm quality. The functional
form of the truncating function can be speciﬁed in various ways reﬂecting
the decision making process within the bank. This makes the model ﬂexible
for variations in corporate structure. Here, we assume that the bank’s man-
agement has absolute control over the truncating function allowing us to
treat λ as the bank’s decision variable. As such, the solution to the bank’s
optimisation problem in the artiﬁcial economy bears obvious resemblance to
the results derived in the previous section. To see this, deﬁne the value of
the truncating function at time t as λi,t. Using the results in the previous
section and acknowledging that the banks now rely on noisy estimates of
ﬁrm quality, we rewrite the representative bank’s objective function as:4
E[πb,t|θb
k,t ≤ θ∗





We condition on the proﬁt maximising value of θ∗ and maximise (3.5) with
respect to λt, including the regulatory bodies constraint (3.1). This gives us










if CARt > K
0 if CARt ≤ K
indicating that in an economic environment with ﬁxed interest rates, the cri-





t < 0 it follows that ∂θ∗
t/∂t > 0, using that θ∗
t is monoton-
ically increasing in λt. Stated diﬀerently, banks tend to take on more risky
debt as the economy evolves.
However, the economy will suﬀer from short term ﬂuctuations around
the time path of the criterion needed for credit due to noisy estimates of
ﬁrm quality. To see this, we acknowledge that E[θ|θk ≤ θ∗
t(λ∗




t)] where the inequality is due to imperfect estimates of ﬁrm quality.5
It is reasonable to assume that banks learn about the quality of ﬁrms by in-
terim information production, Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Holmstr¨ om
and Tirole (1997). Thus, we assume that the bank observes the true qual-
ity of ﬁrms for the subpopulation of ﬁrms currently in its debt portfolio.





  ˆ mt−1
k θk,t−1/ˆ mt−1. Relating this to the proﬁt maximis-
ing conditional default rate in (2.9), we let the bank solve for the point of
4Since E[θ
b] = E[θ] + E[φ] = θ
e.
5See Appendix B for details.
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     
θ∗
t−1 − c, if
  ˆ mt−1





  ˆ mt−1




t−1 + c, if
  ˆ mt−1
k θk,t−1/ˆ mt−1 <
r
2(1 + r)
where 0 ≤ c ≤ r/(2(1 + r)) is a parameter representing the speed by which
banks move towards the optimal truncation point. In addition, the bank is
refrained from lending if CARt ≤ K, honouring the regulatory rule in (3.1).
Examining the iterative procedure above, deﬁning θ∗
t, we acknowledge
four things. First, since the optimal truncation point, θ∗
t, represents the
criterion needed for credit and since the truncation point determines the
riskiness of the bank’s credit portfolio; movements towards the optimal trun-
cation point can be thought of as movements towards the bank’s internal
credit risk goal. Thus, c represents the speed of adjustment to the bank’s
internal credit risk goal. Second, given the parameter space of c, the bank
may “overshoot” its own credit risk goal and acquire a debt portfolio char-
acterized by more risk then as stated in (2.9). This opens up for periods
characterised by “over lending” in which over lending banks try to reduce
their exposure to credit risk by tightening the criterion needed for credit.
Third, if such a tightening occurs simultaneously across banks, the economy
may move into a time period in which credit and investment capital is hard
to obtain. Fourth, the bank’s initial debt contracts may inﬂuence the bank’s
future decision regarding θ∗. To reduce this eﬀect, we set θ∗
0 = 0 allowing
the bank to steadily build up the riskiness of its credit portfolio using the
iterative procedure as stated above.
Banks with a low value of c take small steps towards the optimal level
of credit risk. Hence, the bank’s speed of adjustment to its internal credit
risk goal reﬂects the level of conservatism within the bank’s organisational
structure where conservative banks have a relatively low value of c. Relating
c to the real world, the speed of adjustment to the bank’s internal credit risk
goal can be thought of as a parameter reﬂecting the bank’s willingness to
engage in new risky ventures or as its willingness to use new and unexplored
debt instruments characterised by more or unexplored risk. Since we are
interested in the determinants of credit crunches, we study the case in which
all banks are equally conservative. This allows us interpret c as a parameter
reﬂecting the general level of conservatism in the economy.
4 Simulations
In order to ﬁnd the determinants of credit crunches, we simulate the artiﬁcial
economy in diﬀerent states, implementing the framework discussed in the
13previous sections.6 We ﬁrst deﬁne a restrictive measure of a credit crunch
within the context of the model and then explore the properties of the
artiﬁcial economy through a selected simulation. The selected simulation
is chosen as to illustrate the features of a progressive economy populated
with many credit worthy ﬁrms.
When deﬁning a restrictive and measurable variable of a credit crunch,
we ﬁrst acknowledge that a credit crunch is deﬁned as a period in time in
which credit and investment capital is diﬃcult to obtain. By focusing on
the decisions made by the suppliers of credit, i.e. the banks, we see that a
credit crunch is intrinsically related to the banks’ decisions regarding θ∗
i,t. If
the average truncation point drops below some threshold, investment capital
becomes hard to obtain since only a small sample of ﬁrms are eligible for
credit. Using this, in the absence of a stringent formal deﬁnition, we deﬁne




i,t = 0, ∀i, t > 0
0, if else
which by all means of measurement is a tightening of the criterion needed
for credit. Arguably, this deﬁnition relates to the probability in (3.3) since "N
i θ∗
i,t → 0 ⇒ Pr(Contractt) → 0. However, the deﬁnition above neglects
the potential eﬀects on the supply of credit caused by (i) the banks’ inabil-
ity to live up to the capital requirements, and (ii) the potential eﬀects on
crunches caused by risk based regulatory changes aﬀecting (3.3) through
Pr(CARi,t ≥ K). Remembering that all debt is unweighted in this version
of the model, we neglect these issues.
The properties of the model are illustrated through a selected simulation
of the credit market in which banks have close to perfect ﬁrm quality esti-
mates (σf = 0.0001) and where the unconditional expected default rate (θe
t)
is lower than the banks’ optimal expected default rate as stipulated in (2.9).
Thus, since T = 0.5, ex-ante we may expect banks with almost perfect ﬁrm
quality estimates to set θ∗
i,t = 0.5 . However, since banks may oversample
from the pool of risky ﬁrms, occasional and periodic decreases in the average
truncation point is expected. The parameters of the beta distribution are
chosen to be α = 2.6 and β = 150 such that ﬁrm quality is distributed with
a heavy tail to the right. Given this, the unconditional expected default rate
at the initial time period is θe
0 ≈ 1.7 percent. The interest rate on external
capital is set to r = 4 percent such that the optimal conditional expected
default rate is 1.92 percent, i.e. 22 basis points higher than the uncondi-
tional expected default rate. We set the minimum capital requirements to
K = 8 percent, replicating the capital requirements enforced by the bank for
international settlements in Basel, assuming that banks are refrained from
holding capital to mitigate future risks. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of
6The NetLogo environment is used for the simulations. The code is available on request.














































Figure 2: Sum of ﬁrm debt and the average truncation point (gray).
debt and the average truncation point in an artiﬁcial economy lasting 5000
time periods where the ﬁrst 500 observations have been removed in order
to get rid of transients. The model is simulated with M0 = 2000 ﬁrms,
N0 = 5 banks and the torus constructed from b = 11. The initial equity of
the banks is set to Eb
0 = 2 and ﬁrms are born with E
f
0 = 1. The speed of
adjustment to the banks’ internal credit risk goals is set to c = 0.02 and the
debts minimum time to maturity is set to κ = 10.
From Figure 2 we see that the aggregated debt level has a positive trend,
exhibiting cyclical tendencies. In addition, we acknowledge that ﬁrm debt
is closely related to variations in the average truncation point (the criterion
needed for credit). The average truncation point occasionally deviates from
the proﬁt maximising solution and at t = 4440 the economy evolved into
a two period credit crunch. The crunch and the preceding decrease in the
average truncation point caused a 58.37 percent drop in debt, compared to
the aggregate debt’s local maximum at t = 3640. Since all parameters are
held constant during the simulation period, this indicates that crunches have
a natural tendency to occur even if banks have near to perfect estimates of
ﬁrm quality, in the absence of new regulatory rules or sudden variations in
ﬁrm quality.
During the time period preceding the credit crunch, the aggregate debt
level experienced a heavy growth, despite occasional periodic decreases in the
average truncation point. The sudden downturn in debt and the coordinated
tightening of the criterion needed for credit (reduced θ∗
i,t) forcing the onset
of a credit crunch, indicates that banks tend to over lend, acquiring a debt
portfolio characterised by more risk then the proﬁt maximising level of credit
risk. When realised, the banks seek to “wash out” previously acquired bad
15Figure 3: Value of lending to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms by Swedish banks in billion
SEK. Financial crisis enlarged for comparison. Source: Statistics Sweden.
debt by a tightening of the criterion needed for credit. For comparison,
Figure 3 exhibits the evolution of lending made by Swedish banks to Swedish
non ﬁnancial ﬁrms from January 1998 to September 2010. The series shows a
reduced growth in lending after the internet bubble of 2001 and a sharp drop
in lending during the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. By enlarging
the evolution of lending during the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crises and
comparing the ﬁgures, we see an obvious resemblance.
The evolution of ﬁrm assets are displayed in Figure 4. The series is
characterised by a positive trend, growing on average with 5 basis points
per time period.7 The positive trend is frequently broken by sequential
downturns, possibly due to reduced lending and sequential ﬁrm defaults.
Such “busts” to the economy are suspected to be highly dependent on the
criterion needed for credit since the equation of motion deﬁning the evolution
of ﬁrms’ asset values is deﬁned by ﬁrm quality. Time periods characterised
by little or no lending reduces the supply of investment capital. As such,
ﬁrms have no means of funding potentially fruitful projects, reducing the
aggregate growth level of ﬁrm assets. In addition, the series is characterised
by seemingly random “booms” possibly caused by an increase in project
funding and numerous successful projects. Furthermore, we acknowledge
that the series shows signs of increased volatility after the onset of the credit
crunch at t = 4440, possibly due to the sparse number of new debt contracts.
7We only measure ﬁrms active on the credit market, i.e. ﬁrms granted credit at least























Figure 4: Average ﬁrm assets.
4.1 The determinants of credit crunches
From the selected series, we acknowledge that the artiﬁcial economy has a
natural tendency to spontaneously evolve into a credit crunch. However,
the determinants of crunches remain undetermined. In order to ﬁnd the
parameters of the model that can be held accountable for supply side drops
in credit, data is collected from simulations of the artiﬁcial economy, limited
to a sequence of 5000 time periods. The experimental plan used in the study
is presented in Table 1.
Since the liquidity of the credit market, ψ, deﬁning the probability of
sudden demand side drops in credit, is jointly determined by the minimum
time to maturity (κ), the number of ﬁrms (Mt), the number of banks (Nt)
and the size of the torus (b), we choose to hold the size of the torus con-
stant throughout the simulation periods. Remembering that all debt is
unweighted in this version of the model, we deem it unlikely that regulatory
changes between states will aﬀect the criterion needed for credit. Thus, we
keep K constant at 8 percent in all simulations. Since the parameters of the
beta distribution deﬁnes the evolution of ﬁrm assets as well the probability
of ﬁrm default, these parameters represents the state of the economy. The
parameters of the beta distribution are varied in two states such that θe
0
takes on the same value for diﬀerent values of α and β on a subset of the
simulations.
Given the experimental plan in Table 1, we simulate the artiﬁcial econ-
omy in 256 diﬀerent states with 100 replications resulting in a total of 25,600
observations. If the economy experiences a crunch during a simulation pe-
riod, the result is documented and a new simulation is initiated. Thus, the
onset of a credit crunch is deﬁned as a dichotomous variable with one obser-
17Table 1: Experimental plan.
Variables & treatments Initial Values & Constants Variable of Interest
c : [0.0001,0.01] θ∗
i,0 = 0 Crunch = 1
r : [2%,4%,] Eb
i,0 = 2
α : [1.67,2.5] E
f
j,0 = 1
β : [100,150] b = 11




vation per simulation run. We acknowledge that the variable of interest is
dependent on the vector of observables such that the probability of a crunch
can be estimated using a standard logit model. To determine the eﬀects
on crunches caused by the parameters of the beta distribution we estimate
two models. The estimates from the logit models are displayed in Table 2
from which we only seek to interpret the signs of the estimates due to the
theoretical nature of the model.
Examining Table 2, we conclude that an increase in the speed of ad-
justment to the banks’ internal credit risk goals (c) has a positive eﬀect on
the probability of a credit crunch. This implies that a more conservative
approach to lending reduces the probability of sudden supply side drops in
credit, even in the absence of variations in the economic conditions; this be-
ing a partially overlooked component contributing to the ﬁnancial stability
of an economy.
In addition, we ﬁnd that an increase in the interest rate on external
capital (r), interpreted as the spread between the lending and the deposit
rate, has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on the probability of a crunch.
Relating a credit crunch to the criterion needed for credit, this result is
fully in line with the ﬁndings in the theoretical part of this paper. We also
ﬁnd that an increase in the expected default rate at the initial date (θe
0)
increases the probability of a credit crunch, as previously suggested in the
theoretical part of this paper. Turning to the estimates on the parameters of
the beta distribution, we see that an increase in α increases the probability
of a credit crunch. This corresponds to an increase in the unconditional
expected default rate (θe) since an increase in α moves the mode of the
truncated beta distribution to the right. In contrast, an increase in β reduces
the probability of a credit crunch. Such an increase centres the probability
density mass around the mode of the distribution increasing the “distance”
to riskier loans. This can be thought of as homogenising ﬁrm quality which
reduces the probability of a crunch. Since θk is drawn from the truncated
beta distribution and since θk deﬁnes the evolution of ﬁrm assets, this result
18Table 2: Maximum Likelihood estimates from the logit model on credit
crunches.
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is fully in in line with predictions from the asset deterioration hypothesis.
Turning to the banks’ estimates of ﬁrm quality, the results indicate that
an increase in the noise aﬃliated with ﬁrm speciﬁc estimates of ﬁrm quality
increases the probability of a credit crunch. Thus, we are able to conﬁrm the
importance of ﬁrm quality estimates as implicitly suggested by the literature
in banking.
In addition, an increase in the debts’ minimum time to maturity (κ)
decreases the probability of a credit crunch. This result suggests that an
increase in the average time to maturity reduces the probability of a credit
crunch. To our knowledge, this is an up till now overlooked component
determining the onset of credit crunches. Looking at the additional param-
eters deﬁning market liquidity, we see that an increase in market density,
working through an increase in the numbers of ﬁrms (M) and banks (N),
reduces the probability of a credit crunch.
The results presented in this section are to be interpreted in the light of
how the artiﬁcial economy is constructed. Due to random movements of a
ﬁnite number of ﬁrms on a torus, banks do not meet the full distribution
of eligible ﬁrms at every instant. Since banks have adaptive expectations
about the credit risk in their debt portfolio, they continue to increase θ∗
i,t
until the credit risk in its debt portfolio equals/or overrides their proﬁt
maximising level of credit risk. Acknowledging that ﬁrms are allowed to
make repayments on matured debt in every time period, the risk associated
with a bank’s debt portfolio can increase rapidly if the bank grants credit to
risky ﬁrms at the same instant as less risky ﬁrms meet their obligations to
the bank. Thus, the faster the bank adjusts to internal credit risk goals, the
higher the probability of retrieving a debt portfolio deﬁned by a suboptimal
expected default rate. Simultaneous reductions in truncation points due to
19spontaneous wash outs of bad debt may then lead to an absolute tightening
of the criterion needed for credit forcing the onset of a supply side credit
crunch. On the other hand, if the lending capacities of banks are locked
in contacts with long maturity dates, the probability of issuing credit to
numerous risky ﬁrms at the same instant is decreased. This may oﬀset
some of the negative side eﬀects caused by rapid variations in the banks’
truncation points.
The eﬀects on crunches caused by the parameters of the beta distribu-
tion, is more easily understood if we view them in the light of this new
insight. If α is increased, the mode of the distribution deﬁning ﬁrm qual-
ity is moved to the right, reducing the proportion of ﬁrms aﬄicted with
an acceptable default risk. Hence, an increase of α can be thought of re-
ducing the sample size of eligible ﬁrms. As such, rapid increases in the
truncation point conditioned on relatively large values of α may result in an
oversampling of risky ﬁrms from the bank’s perspective, forcing a tightening
of criterion needed for credit. An increase of β, on the other hand, increases
the distance to risky ﬁrms, dampening the negative side eﬀect caused by
rapid variations in the banks’ truncation points. In addition, if the interest
rate is lowered, i.e. the spread between the lending and the deposit rate
is decreased, a smaller sample of ﬁrms have the ability to bear a positive
contribution to the banks’ expected proﬁts. The banks react to this by only
granting credit to a subgroup of ﬁrms that add positive value to the banks’
expected proﬁts. Rapid variations in the banks’ truncation points will then
lead to an oversampling from the segment of value reducing ﬁrms. Over-
sampling from this segment may then lead to a downturn in lending and
possibly, to the onset of a credit crunch.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the determinants and causes of credit crunches. We
start by deriving a theoretical banking model in which lenders screen appli-
cants in order to reduce their exposure to default risk. We use the theoretical
model and highlight the importance of interest rates and expected default
rate on the criterion needed for credit. By viewing the credit market as a
complex adaptive system, we proceed by constructing a novel Agent Based
Model (ABM) of a credit market based on the results from the theoretical
model. The results from the simulations indicate that crunches have a ten-
dency to occur even if banks have close to perfect estimates of ﬁrm quality
and when ﬁrm quality remains constant in the absence of new regulatory
rules. We then use the ABM and ﬁnd that an increase in the speed by which
banks adjust to their internal credit risk goal, increases the probability of
a credit crunch. We link this parameter to the level of conservatism in the
market and conclude that a more conservative approach to lending leads to
20fewer credit crunches, an up till now partially overlooked component con-
tribution to the ﬁnancial stability of an economy. In addition, we are able
to show that the onset of crunches are aﬀected by variations in the market
conditions deﬁning the evolution of ﬁrm assets. If the economy is in a state
characterised by few credit worthy ﬁrms, the probability of a credit crunch
is increased, fully in line with the asset deterioration hypothesis. The sim-
ulations also show that an increase in the debts time to maturity reduces
the probability of a credit crunch. This is to our knowledge an overlooked
component contributing to the probability of a credit crunch. Thus, this
paper is able to give new insights in existing theory as well as to highlight
the importance of a conservative approach to lending and time to maturity
if policy makers seek to reduce the probability of a credit crunch.
A The ﬁrms’ asset values
Assume that the representative ﬁrm has a calendar-time counterpart that
acts on a credit market where the time horizon is represented by Tm. Fix a
probability space (Ω,F,P) on which there is a standard Brownian motion
W. Let (Ft)t∈Tm be a ﬁltration on the probability space such that the σ-
algebra Ft represents the collection of observable events up to time t. Given
the above, it is assumed that the asset value of the ﬁrm’s calendar-time





t dt + σA
f
t dWt (A.1)
where W is a standard Brownian motion under the probability measure P.






t (µ∆t + σ∆Wt) (A.2)
Since the evolution is bounded by the endpoint, Tm we let Wt−τ = Wt−1
such that the ﬁrm’s asset value remains constant between maturity dates.
Given this, we let time evolve in multiples of one such that ∆WTm = WTm−
















Tm). Thus, the drift terms enter by asymmetric










σ∗∆WTm. Use that L
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Tm−1 is constant between maturity dates and let the













Tm−1 < 0) = Pr(ETm−1 + σ∗∆WTm < 0) = θ. Solve
for the σ∗
Tm that forces the ﬁrm to default with probability θ at the maturity
21date and it follows that σ∗
Tm = E
f
Tm−1/Φ−1(θ) where Φ−1(θ) is the inverse
of the standard normal distribution taken at ﬁrm quality. Thus, we rewrite
the representative ﬁrm’s equation of motion as:
A
f




where θ ∈ [0,0.5] due to the symmetry of the standard normal distribution.
B Expected default rates
Let θk represent realisations of f(θ) and let φk represent realisations from
f(φ). We seek the conditional expected default rate conditioned on a mea-
surement error in expectations, i.e. E[θ|θb ≤ θ∗] = E[θ|θ+φ ≤ θ∗] = E[θ|θ ≤
θ∗ − φ] = E[θ|θ ≤ ˆ θ∗]. As such, we have a random truncation, selected out
of a density f(ˆ θ∗). Since φ ∼ N(0,σf) it follows that ˆ θ∗ ∼ N(θ∗,σf). How-
ever, we truncate the distribution such that ˆ θ∗ ∈ [0,T ]. Given this, the
expected truncation point is:
E[ ˆ θ∗|0 ≤ ˆ θ∗ ≤ T ] =
! T
0 ˆ θ∗f( ˆ θ∗)d ˆ θ∗
F ˆ θ∗(T ) − F ˆ θ∗(0)
From this it follows that:





k ≤ θ∗] =
! E[ ˆ θ∗|0≤ ˆ θ∗≤T ]
0 θf(θ) dθ
Fθ(θ∗)
where Fθ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of θ. Hence, the bank
fails to ﬁnd the optimal expected default rate.
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